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“THE MORE YOU BUY, THE BIGGER YOUR TAX
BREAK”: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN
VOSS V. COMMISSIONER ERRED IN
INTERPRETING THE DEBT LIMITATIONS OF
THE HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
Michelle Monroy
I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States imposed its first income tax in 1913, all
interest was deductible.1 After Congress passed the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, however, only the qualified residence interest deduction
(“mortgage interest deduction”) was retained.2 President Ronald
Reagan declared the mortgage interest deduction beyond the reach of
tax reformers by instructing the Department of the Treasury
(“Treasury”) to “preserve that part of the American dream which the
home mortgage interest deduction symbolizes.”3
The deduction costs the federal government about $70 billion a
year, making it one of the government’s largest federal tax
expenditures.4 In fact, the deduction “has never ranked lower than
third on the government’s list of costliest tax expenditure items.”5

. J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science,
2014, California State University, Long Beach.
1. Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How
and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 751, 755
(2012); see Revenue Act of 1913, sec II. para. b, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114, 167 (“That in
computing net income for the purpose of the normal tax there shall be allowed as deductions:
. . . second, all interest paid within the year by a taxable person on indebtedness.”).
2. Morrow, supra note 1, at 755; see Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511,
100 Stat. 2085, 2247.
3. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax
Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 235 (2010) (citing Lou Cannon,
Reagan to Keep Mortgage Tax Deduction, WASH. POST, May 11, 1984, at F1).
4. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Tax Expenditures, in
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 203 (2015), http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY2015.pdf;
see
David M. Schizer, Limiting Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX L. REV. 275, 284 (2015).
5. Ventry, supra note 3, at 235.
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Congress uses tax expenditures to incentivize particular behavior.6
Although the mortgage interest deduction is widely believed to
incentivize homeownership, numerous studies have concluded that
the deduction actually has little impact.7 Instead, the deduction
encourages excessive borrowing and inflates housing prices.8
Despite the significant revenue loss associated with the
mortgage interest deduction, the deduction benefits only a small
percentage of taxpayers.9 The mortgage interest deduction is
available only to taxpayers who itemize their deductions.10
Taxpayers who claim the standard deduction do not receive any
benefit.11 In 2013, only one-third of all taxpayers itemized their
deductions.12 The amount of the benefit favored those itemizing
taxpayers in higher income brackets and with larger mortgages.13 In
2012, seventy-seven percent of the benefits from the deduction went
to homeowners with incomes above $100,000.14 Homeowners with
less expensive homes or those who have built up equity in their
homes do not receive any benefit because their potential deduction is
less than the standard deduction.15 The recent Ninth Circuit opinion
in Voss v. Commissioner16 may have widened the gap between
taxpayers who derive benefit from the mortgage interest deduction
and those who do not.17
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit in Voss incorrectly
interpreted section 163(h)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the
6. See Morrow, supra note 1, at 817.
7. David Frederick, Reconciling Intentions with Outcomes: A Critical Examination of the
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 28 AKRON TAX J. 41, 43 (2013).
8. See Morrow, supra note 1, at 771, 775.
9. Id. at 759.
10. Schizer, supra note 4, at 315 (“[O]nly those who itemize (instead of claiming the
standard deduction) are eligible for tax expenditures.”).
11. Id.
12. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 1304 (REV. 08-2015),
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 2013 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13inalcr.pdf
(Table 1.2 reports 44,330,496 total tax returns with itemized deductions, and 100,898,698 total
tax returns with the standard deduction).
13. Morrow, supra note 1, at 760.
14. Will Fischer and Chye-Ching Huang, Mortgage Interest Deduction is Ripe for Reform,
CTR. ON BUDGET POL’Y & PRIORITIES (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/research/mortgage
-interest-deduction-is-ripe-for-reform; Anthony Randazzo & Dean Stansel, Mortgage Interest
Deduction Saves Middle Class Taxpayers of $51/Month, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2013, 8:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/12/18/mortgage-interest-deduction-saves-middle-class
-taxpayers-all-of-51month.
15. Morrow, supra note 1, at 760.
16. 796 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2015).
17. Id. at 1053.
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“Code”) by interpreting the mortgage interest deduction debt
limitations as applying per-taxpayer. Part II details the statutory
framework of Code section 163(h)(3) (“Code Section (h)(3)”). Part
III explores the facts of the Voss case, while Part IV highlights the
Tax Court and Ninth Circuit courts’ reasoning. Part V addresses why
the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the provision per-taxpayer by
misinterpreting the statutory language and in failing to consider the
policy implications of a per-taxpayer approach. In addition, Part V
further details the application of the court’s reasoning in National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services.18
Part VI explains why the Voss decision merits Treasury regulation
treatment, and Part VII concludes that the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) should issue a Treasury regulation adopting the Tax Court’s
interpretation of the Code.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
When calculating taxable income, deductions allowed by the
Code—the United States’ statutory tax law—reduce the amount of a
taxpayer’s gross income.19 Individual taxpayers may choose between
itemized deductions and the standard deduction.20 When a taxpayer
itemizes his or her deductions, he or she reduces taxable income by a
series of deductions that are specifically outlined in the Code, such as
deductions for medical expenses, charitable contributions, or state
income taxes paid.21 When a taxpayer claims the standard deduction,
he or she reduces taxable income by a single amount determined by
his or her filing status.22 Usually, taxpayers will itemize deductions if
the total amount of their itemized deductions will exceed the
standard deduction.23 To claim the mortgage interest deduction, a
taxpayer must itemize his or her deductions.24
In general, the Code disallows deductions for personal
interest.25 Personal interest includes, but is not limited to, interest
18. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
19. I.R.C. § 63(a) (2015).
20. See I.R.C. § 63(b) (2012).
21. See Jason Summers, Should You Itemize Your Deductions? Tax Tips for Claiming
Itemizing Deductions vs. the Standard Deduction, U.S. TAX CENTER (Jan. 22, 2015), http://
www.irs.com/articles/should-you-itemize-your-deductions.
22. Id. (A taxpayer’s filing status can be single, head of household, married filing jointly, or
married filing separately).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (2015).
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paid on a loan to purchase a car for personal use or interest on credit
card charges.26 Qualified residence interest is a type of personal
interest, but is not subject to the disallowance.27 Qualified residence
interest refers to any interest paid or accrued on debt secured by a
taxpayer’s qualified residence.28
There are two types of qualified residence indebtedness: (1)
acquisition indebtedness and (2) home equity indebtedness.29 The
mortgage interest deduction allows taxpayers to deduct the amount
of interest paid on both acquisition indebtedness and home equity
indebtedness secured by a qualified residence.30
Acquisition indebtedness refers to any debt that the taxpayer
incurs in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving his or
her qualified residence.31 A qualified residence includes both the
taxpayer’s principal residence and a second residence.32 Home equity
indebtedness denotes to any debt in excess of acquisition
indebtedness that does not exceed the fair market value of the
residence.33
When a taxpayer secures a residence with a mortgage, the
taxpayer can deduct the amount of interest paid on the mortgage.
However, taxpayers may not be entitled to a deduction for interest
paid on the entire principal amount of the mortgage. Taxpayers are
limited to interest paid on $1 million of acquisition indebtedness
($500,000 in the case of married individuals filing separately) and
interest paid on $100,000 of home equity indebtedness ($50,000 in
the case of married individuals filing separately).34 Therefore,
taxpayers are limited to interest paid on $1.1 million of debt in total.
The issue in Voss v. Commissioner was whether to apply the debt
limitation using a per-taxpayer or per-residence approach.35
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bruce Voss and Charles Sophy (“Taxpayers”) were, at all
26. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 17 (10311G), TAX
GUIDE 2015 FOR INDIVIDUALS 157 (2014).
27. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2015).
28. Id. § 163(h)(3)(A).
29. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)–(C).
30. See id. § 163(h)(3).
31. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B).
32. Id. § 163(h)(4)(A).
33. Id. § 163(h)(3)(C).
34. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii)–(C)(ii).
35. Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
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relevant times, domestic partners registered with the State of
California.36 They co-owned two residences located in Rancho
Mirage, California, and Beverly Hills, California, as joint tenants.37
The Taxpayers financed the purchase of each residence with a
mortgage secured by the residence.38 The balance of the two
mortgages in 2006 and 2007, the years at issue, was about $2.7
million.39 The issue in Voss was whether (a) the debt limitation
applies per-residence, such that the Taxpayers could deduct only
interest on a combined total of $1.1 million of debt, or (b) the debt
limitation applies per-taxpayer, such that the Taxpayers could each
deduct interest on $1.1 million, for a combined total of $2.2 million
of debt.40
In 2006 and 2007, the Taxpayers each claimed the mortgage
interest deduction for $1.1 million of debt, or a total of $2.2
million.41 The IRS audited the Taxpayers and issued proposed
notices of deficiency, limiting their interest deduction to $1.1 million
in total.42 In response, each Taxpayer filed a petition with the Tax
Court.43 The Tax Court issued an opinion in favor of the IRS,
holding that the debt limitation applied on a per-residence basis when
co-owners are not married to each other.44 The Ninth Circuit took the
case on appeal and reviewed it de novo.45 In holding that the debt
limitation applied per-taxpayer, it reversed the Tax Court’s decision
and remanded for further proceedings to determine the amount of
qualified residence interest that the Taxpayers were entitled to
deduct, and the proper amount of any remaining deficiency.46
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The Tax Court
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Voss reversed the Tax Court’s

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1053.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
Sophy v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 204, 204 (2012).
Voss, 796 F.3d at 1057.
Id. at 1068.
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decision in Sophy v. Commissioner.47 In Sophy, the Tax Court held
that the limitation applied per-residence.48 In its analysis, the Tax
Court highlighted several reasons as to why the debt limitation
applied per-residence. First, the court looked at the statutory
language defining “acquisition indebtedness” and “home equity
indebtedness.”49 Next, it found that the definitions contain the phrase
“any indebtedness,” which is not qualified by language related to an
individual taxpayer.50 In addition, the definition of “qualified
residence interest” contains the phrase “with respect to any qualified
residence,” which focuses entirely on the residence, rather than the
taxpayer.51
The court noted that while “taxpayer” appears several times in
the section, any reference to an individual taxpayer is absent from the
language of the debt limitations.52 Furthermore, any reference to the
“taxpayer” relates to the qualified residence, rather than to the
indebtedness.53 In analyzing the language as a whole, the court found
that the repeated emphasis on “qualified residence” supports the
contention that the debt limitations are limited in relation to the
qualified residence, and not in relation to an individual taxpayer.54
Second, the court looked at the language contained in the
parenthetical addressing married taxpayers filing separate tax
returns.55 The parenthetical language limits each married taxpayer
filing separately to one-half of the debt limitation, such that he or she
cannot deduct interest on more than $1.1 million of his or her
mortgage.56 The Taxpayers in Sophy argued that the parenthetical
language created a “marriage penalty” that did not apply to
unmarried co-owners.57 However, the court found it more likely that
47. Id. at 1053.
48. Sophy, 138 T.C. at 213.
49. Id. at 210.
50. Id.
51. Id.; Voss, 796 F.3d at 1056.
52. Sophy; 138 T.C. at 210; Voss, 796 F.3d at 1056; see I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (2015)
(“The aggregate amount treated as acquisition indebtedness for any period shall not exceed
$1,000,000.”); id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (“The aggregate amount treated as home equity indebtedness
for any period shall not exceed $100,000.”).
53. Sophy, 138 T.C. at 211.
54. Id. at 212.
55. Id.; see I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (“$500,000 in the case of a married individual filing a
separate return”); id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (“$50,000 in the case of a separate return by a married
individual”).
56. Sophy, 138 T.C. at 212.
57. Id.
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the language provided a specific allocation of the debt limitation that
must be used by married taxpayers filing separately, implying that
unmarried co-owners could choose how to allocate the debt
limitations.58 Noting that nothing in the legislative history of Code
Section (h)(3) suggested the contrary, the Tax Court concluded that
the debt limitations applied on a per-residence basis.59
B. The Ninth Circuit
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Voss rejected the Tax
Court’s interpretation of Code Section (h)(3).60 The Ninth Circuit
explained that finding an answer from the language in Code Section
(h)(3) “requires considerable effort” because the statute is mostly
silent as to how the debt limitations apply to unmarried co-owners.61
The court noted that relevant Treasury Regulation section 1.163-10T
is also silent on the issue.62 However, the court found some textual
guidance in the parenthetical language addressing married
individuals filing separately.63 In particular, the court held that the
use of the phrase “in the case of” suggests that the language in the
parentheticals contains an exception to the general debt limitations,
not an illustration of how the limitation should be allocated.64
In its interpretation of the parenthetical language, the Ninth
Circuit offered three insights.65 First, the parentheticals speak in pertaxpayer terms because the language states that the limit is for
“$500,000 in the case of a married individual filing a separate
return” and “$50,000 in the case of a separate return by a married
individual.”66 The court reasoned that if Congress had wanted to
draft the parenthetical language in per-residence terms, it could have
done so by stating, “in the case of a qualified residence of a married
individual filing a separate return,” the debt limitations apply.67
Second, the parentheticals operate in per-taxpayer terms.68 The
parentheticals give each spouse a separate debt limitation of
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 213.
Id.
See Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1058 n. 5.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 105859.
Id. at 1059.
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$550,000, so that the two spouses are entitled to a combined $1.1
million debt limitation.69 In other words, the $550,000 debt limit is to
be applied per spouse.70 Because the debt limitation applies pertaxpayer for married individuals, the court suggested that the general
debt limitations also apply per-taxpayer.71
Lastly, the inclusion of the parentheticals suggests that the debt
limits apply per-taxpayer.72 The court argued that if the $1.1 million
debt limit applied per-residence, the parenthetical language would be
superfluous because there would be no need to provide that each
spouse gets a $550,000 debt limit.73 However, if the debt limit is
applied per-taxpayer, the parentheticals play a role in giving each
spouse half of the debt limit so that the couple is subject to the same
debt limit as that of a jointly filing couple.74 In fact, Congress has
done so in other provisions of the Code.75
The Ninth Circuit found the Tax Court’s argument, that the
parentheticals acted as a specific allocation, unpersuasive because
Congress would not prevent spouses from allocating debt limitations
as they choose, especially since most spouses own their home as
equal partners.76 The Ninth Circuit determined that the language
ensures that all married couples are treated as a single taxpayer.77 In
addition, the statute’s apparent focus on “qualified residence” was
unpersuasive on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.78 The Court stated
that any reasonable reader would understand that the statute refers to
a taxpayer, despite the omission of the word “taxpayer.”79
The Ninth Circuit highlighted certain difficulties in applying a
per-residence reading.80 First, the court found that the repeated
reference to a “taxable year” indicates that the statute should be read
as applying a per-taxpayer approach because residences do not have

69. Id.
70. Id. (per spouse can also be referred to as per taxpayer).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 105960.
74. Id. at 1060.
75. Id. at 1061; see, e.g., I.R.C. § 22(c)(2)(A) (providing an initial credit of $7,500 to a
qualifying married couple filing jointly and a credit of $3,750 in the case of a married individual
filing a separate return).
76. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1060.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1062.
79. Id. at 1062.
80. Id. at 1063.
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taxable years, only taxpayers do.81 The court reasoned that if
Congress intended to apply the debt limits per-taxpayer, it would be
unlikely that Congress would define qualified residence interest with
respect to a single taxable year.82 Second, it is unclear how coowners with different taxable years could determine the amount of
indebtedness for any period.83 Third, two co-owners might each have
a separate principal residence or separate secondary residence so that
co-owners will have to coordinate tax returns to ensure that each
qualified residence does not exceed $1 million.84 The court
concluded that the impracticability of applying the provisions under
a per-residence approach suggests that Congress never intended to
apply that approach; therefore, the statute should be read as applying
per-taxpayer.85
V. ANALYSIS: THE IRS SHOULD PROMULGATE A REGULATION
FOLLOWING THE APPROACH OF THE TAX COURT
The Ninth Circuit erred in interpreting Code section (h)(3) as
applying the debt limitations per-taxpayer. First, the court incorrectly
relied on the statute’s treatment of married individuals filing separate
tax returns. Second, it failed to take into consideration the policy
implications of a per-taxpayer approach. Third, the section’s
legislative history suggests that Congress intended to apply the debt
limitations per-residence. Lastly, existing interpretative guidance
supports the implementation of a per-residence approach. However,
the Ninth Circuit was not required to defer to existing interpretative
guidance on the issue. Therefore, the IRS should update Treasury
Regulation section 1.163-10T and implement the Tax Court’s
approach. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Brand X would
require courts to defer to this regulation when interpreting Code
Section (h)(3).
A. The Ninth Circuit Erred in Interpreting
Code Section 163(h)(3)
The Ninth Circuit in Voss found that Code section (h)(3) was
silent as to whether the debt limitation of $1.1 million applied per81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1064.
Id.
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residence or per-taxpayer.86 As a result, it issued its own
interpretation of the statutory language.87 However, the court erred in
interpreting Code section (h)(3) as applying per-taxpayer.
The Ninth Circuit placed too much emphasis on the language
found in the parentheticals regarding married taxpayers filing
separately.88 The court argued that the parentheticals clearly spoke
and operated in per-taxpayer terms.89 The parentheticals give each
separately filing spouse a separate debt limit of $500,000 for
acquisition indebtedness and $50,000 for home equity
indebtedness,90 so that the two spouses combined are entitled to a
$1.1 million debt limitation.91 The Ninth Circuit argued that reading
the parentheticals in per-residence terms would result in a debt
limitation of $550,000 combined for married couples.92
The parenthetical language of Code section (h)(3) clearly speaks
in per-taxpayer terms.93 The court correctly concluded that the
purpose of this language is “to ensure that the separately filing
spouse don’t get double the benefit that jointly filing couples get.”94
It reasoned that since the debt limit for married couples filing
separately applies per taxpayer, the general debt limitations should as
well.95 However, the general debt limitations have an entirely
different purpose altogether: they limit the amount of interest that
can be deducted. The parenthetical language is drafted in pertaxpayer terms because its purpose is to avoid double benefits for
separately filing spouses. Drafting the parenthetical language in perresidence terms, if at all possible, would blur this purpose.
The Ninth Circuit stated that “it is a well-established rule of
statutory construction that courts should not interpret statutes in a
way that renders a provision superfluous.”96 It argued that the
parenthetical language would be superfluous if the general debt

86. Id. at 1053.
87. Id.
88. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (“$500,000 in the case of a married individual filing a
separate return”); id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (“$50,000 in the case of a separate return by a married
individual”).
89. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1058–59.
90. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii); id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii).
91. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1059.
92. Id.
93. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii)–(C)(ii).
94. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1060.
95. Id. at 1059.
96. Id. (citing Chubb Customs Ins. Co. v. Space Sys., 710 F.3d 946, 966 (9th Cir. 2013)).
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limitations are applied in per-residence terms. However, the Supreme
Court has held that it “is appropriate to tolerate a degree of
surplusage language rather than adopt a textually dubious
construction that threatens to render the entire provision a nullity.”97
The parenthetical language performs a significant function in
clarifying how the IRS treats married couples filing separately. As
the Ninth Circuit noted, such language, although unnecessary, aids
the reader in understanding complex tax statutes.98
With regard to the difficulties that may arise in applying the perresidence approach, individual taxpayers must generally adopt the
calendar year as their tax year.99 Therefore, situations in which two
co-owners have different taxable years will not occur on a frequent
basis. Moreover, situations where co-owners own a principal
residence together, and each own separate secondary residences, are
also not determinative of what approach to use.100 Deductions with
respect to payments of joint obligation are to be allocated to
whichever party is liable and makes the payment out of his or her
own funds.101 Therefore, a taxpayer can calculate the amount of his
or her deduction based on what was actually paid, with such
payments affecting other co-owners own deduction calculations.
B. Policy Implications of a Per-Taxpayer Approach
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning ignores the policy implications of
a per-taxpayer approach. The amount of the benefit arising from the
mortgage interest deduction is skewed in favor of taxpayers in higher
income brackets and with larger mortgages.102 In other words, the
deduction benefits taxpayers who would purchase homes with or
without the deduction, failing to promote homeownership amongst
those who need the deduction the most.103 Implementing a per-

97. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007) (concluding that the
phrase “any other person” although made superfluous by the phrase “any other necessary costs,”
serves to clarify the statutory language).
98. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1062 (“In all likelihood, these phrases, though technically unnecessary,
were included simply to ease the reader’s understanding of a complex tax statute full of technical
definitions.”).
99. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. 538 (15068G),
ACCOUNTING PERIODS AND METHODS 4 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p538.pdf.
100. See Voss, 796 F.3d at 1064.
101. Jolson v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 1184, 1186 (1944) (quoting MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, vol. 5, § 27.02 9 (1942)).
102. See Morrow, supra note 1, at 760.
103. See Ventry, supra note 3, at 264.
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taxpayer approach would further skew the benefit in favor of
purchasing larger mortgages because co-owners would no longer be
limited to $1.1 million of indebtedness.
Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 lowered the value of
the mortgage interest deduction due to changes it made in reducing
marginal tax rates, which reduces the amount of the benefit.104
Increasing the standard deduction further diminished the value of the
deduction because it resulted in fewer taxpayers itemizing their
deductions.105 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987
(“OBRA”) further impacted the deduction’s benefit. OBRA
introduced the debt limitations at issue in Voss.106 The changes made
to the mortgage interest deduction “encouraged taxpayers to move
from house to house as the primary mortgage on the house was paid
off or the house increased in value.”107
Throughout the next two decades, politicians sought to increase
homeownership rates.108 In 2005, President George W. Bush
commissioned a tax reform panel to develop strategies for
recognizing the importance of home ownership.109 The panel
recommended that the benefits for home mortgage interest be
retained as a tax credit, rather than as a deduction, as a way to
“encourage home ownership, not big homes.”110 Despite these
recommendations, the deduction remained “untouchable.”111
The mortgage interest deduction is ineffective in promoting
homeownership, “in large part, due to price capitalization.”112 Price
capitalization occurs when the value of the subsidy created by the
mortgage interest deduction increases the price of homes. 113 The
deduction increases the value of housing, therefore increasing the
demand for housing.114 Although price capitalization supports the
mortgage interest deduction’s elimination because it makes housing
104. Id. at 275.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 276 (quoting C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 143
(Urban Inst. Press, 2d ed. 2004)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 276–77 (quoting PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM,
SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 73 (2005)).
111. Id. (quoting Heidi Glenn, Tax Reform Panel’s Ideas Cause Stir in Washington, 109 TAX
NOTES 415, 418 (2005) (quoting Rep. Katherine Harris)).
112. Morrow, supra note 1, at 771.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 772.
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less affordable, it also creates a risk that home value will drop if the
deduction is phased out.115 However, the possible negative effects of
phasing out the deduction should not deter experts from determining
the extent to which the mortgage interest deduction can be reformed
to better meet taxpayer and government needs.
The mortgage interest deduction also played a detrimental role
in housing market crisis by promoting overinvestment in housing.116
Real estate agents emphasized, “the more you buy, the bigger your
tax break.”117 The Ninth Circuit, by interpreting the debt limitations
as applying per-taxpayer, has also promoted overinvestment. Under
the court’s reasoning, owning a home with multiple taxpayers could
result in a virtually limitless deduction. Three co-owners could
deduct interest on up to $3.3 million of debt. Five co-owners could
deduct interest on up to $5.5 million of debt. Where should the
deduction stop?
The policy implications are the same as they were decades ago.
The Voss decision encourages more debt because it means lower
taxes, in turn resulting in a widening the gap between taxpayers who
can benefit from this deduction and those who cannot.118 Following a
per-taxpayer approach further obscures the mortgage interest
deduction’s goal of encouraging homeownership.
C. Congressional Intent Supports a Per-Residence Approach
In 1987, the OBRA amended the definition of qualified
residence interest that is treated as deductible.119 In a congressional
report, the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives
explained that if a taxpayer’s acquisition indebtedness exceeds $1
million, then “only the interest on a total principal amount of $1
million of such debt is deductible as acquisition interest.”120 In other
words, only the first $1 million of the principal is deductible as
acquisition indebtedness. The same treatment is afforded to home
equity indebtedness.121
115. Id.
116. Ventry, supra note 3, at 278 (During this time, politicians sought to increase rates of
homeownership with various tax subsidies, including tax-free rollover of gains on home sales,
which has since been repealed).
117. Id.
118. Cf. id.
119. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1033 (1987).
120. Id.
121. See id.

742

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:729

In Sophy, the court noted that when a statute is silent or
ambiguous, as is the case here, the court may look at the statute’s
legislative history in an attempt to determine congressional intent.122
For purposes of legislative history, congressional committee reports
are the most important source for determining legislative intent. 123 If
a court ascertains that Congress had a particular intention on the
issue, “that intention is the law and must be given effect.”124
Despite the importance of deferring to legislative history, the
court in Voss failed to do so, and instead issued its own
interpretation.125 The congressional report is clear, only $1 million of
the total principal amount can be treated as acquisition
indebtedness.126 For Bruce Voss and Charles Sophy, anything above
the first $1 million of the total principal mortgage balance cannot be
used to determine their interest deduction.
D. Deference Afforded to IRS Guidance on the
Interpretation of Section 163(h)(3)
Other IRS guidance also supports Congressional intent. The
dissent in Voss urged the majority to defer to prior IRS guidance on
the issue.127 In 2009, the IRS issued a Chief Counsel Advice
memorandum (“CCA”) applying the debt limit per-residence.128 A
CCA memorandum is legal advice issued by a national office within
the IRS Office of Chief Counsel.129 The memorandum interprets a
specific provision or a specific set of facts, but is not intended for
taxpayers to rely upon.130 In the memorandum in question, two coowners lived in the residence as joint tenants.131 The aggregate
amount of acquisition indebtedness on the property exceeded the $1

122. Sophy v. Comm’r, 138 T.C. 204, 209 (2012).
123. Legislative History Research Guide, GEO L. LIBR. (Dec. 8, 2015, 1:37 AM), http://
guides.ll.georgetown.edu/legislative_history.
124. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
125. See Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015) (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
126. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1033.
127. Voss, 796 F.3d at 1071 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
128. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2009-11-007 (Mar. 13, 2009).
129. Daniel L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and
Retroactivity in the 21 Century: A View from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323, 357 (2004) (quoting
I.R.C. § 6110(i)(1) (2000)).
130. Id. at 358.
131. Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., Memorandum on the Mortgage Interest
Deduction (Limitation on Acquisition Indebtedness), at 2 (Mar. 13, 2009),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0911007.pdf.
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million limitation.132 The taxpayers argued that they should be able
to deduct interest paid on $1 million of debt each. 133 The IRS
emphasized that acquisition indebtedness is defined as “indebtedness
incurred in acquiring a qualified residence of the taxpayer—not as
indebtedness incurred in acquiring [a] taxpayer’s portion of a
qualified residence.”134 Because the amount of indebtedness in its
entirety constitutes acquisition indebtedness, the $1 million
limitation applies to such amount in its entirety.135
To further support this position, the IRS issued a publication
stating that the dollar limits apply to the combined mortgages on the
taxpayer’s main home and second home.136 In other words, the
limitation applies to the combined balances of the mortgages. Any
amount that exceeds the debt limit may not be used to calculate an
interest deduction.
Despite the dissent’s insistence, the Ninth Circuit gave the Chief
Counsel Advice limited weight.137 In analyzing the proper level of
deference to afford IRS guidance, the reasoning of Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council Inc.138 is pertinent to the
discussion. The Chevron opinion held that courts have a duty to defer
to reasonable agency interpretations when Congress is silent or
leaves ambiguity in a statute that the agency is charged with
administering.139 The Chevron doctrine’s first step asks courts to
decide “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue.”140 If the court finds the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the second step requires courts to
determine whether the agency’s answer is based on a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.141 The issue in post-Chevron cases was
to what statutes and agency interpretations does the Chevron
deference apply.142
The Court in United States v. Mead Corp.143 held that the
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 26, at 153.
Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015).
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 834 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
Id. at 843.
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 139, at 835.
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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amount of deference afforded to agency pronouncements should be
decided on an agency-by-agency basis, and that the weight given in a
particular case will depend on “the degree of the agency’s care, its
consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”144 Under Mead, deciding
whether an agency pronouncement is afforded Chevron deference
requires an analysis of both Congressional intent to delegate
authority to make rules carrying the force of law and the agency’s
intent to adopt rules in the exercise of that authority. 145
The IRC authorizes the Treasury to promulgate regulations.146
The power to promulgate regulations may be conveyed through
several specific statutory authorizations, or through general
authorization granted by section 7805(a) of the Code. 147 The tax
community characterizes specific authority regulations as legislative
and general authority regulations as interpretative.148 However, both
specific and general authority Treasury regulations legally bind
taxpayers and the government.149 Since the Treasury’s promulgated
regulations are legally binding, an analysis of the Mead opinion
would indicate that Treasury regulations should be afforded Chevron
deference.150 However, there is a lack of consensus in authority
regarding the appropriate degree of deference to give in general
authority regulations.151 It was not until the decision of Mayo
Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States152
that courts established Chevron deference controlled over general
authority regulations.153 The same cannot be said about other
interpretative guidance, such as Chief Counsel Advice memorandum
or other IRS publications.
The distinguishing feature between Treasury regulations and
other IRS interpretations is the level of formality by which they are
144. Id. at 228 (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 22627.
146. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack Of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1727, 1732 (2007).
147. Id. at 173536; see I.R.C. § 7805(a)(2015).
148. Hickman, supra note 146, at 1761.
149. Id. at 1736.
150. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1538-39 (2006).
151. See id. at 1545–46 (explaining that interpretative general authority regulations were
entitled to less deference than specific authority regulations).
152. 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
153. Id. at 55–56.
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promulgated.154 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”)
mandates a notice-and-comment process for Treasury regulations.155
However, most of the interpretive guidance the Treasury and IRS
issue is not formally promulgated through a notice-and-comment
process.156 Interpretive guidance, such as Chief Counsel Advice
memoranda, does not carry the same weight as regulations.157 That
is, the Ninth Circuit was correct in refusing to give the Chief Counsel
Advice memorandum importance in reaching a decision in Voss.
Since the Chief Counsel Advice memorandum does very little to
support a per-residence approach, the IRS should update and finalize
temporary Treasury Regulation section 1.163-10T and implement the
Tax Court’s reasoning.158 The Treasury and the IRS have followed
an “interim-final rulemaking” approach when issuing temporary
regulations, which fails to meet the notice-and-comment procedures
mandated by the APA.159 As a result, the IRS should solicit postpromulgation public comments when finalizing temporary Treasury
Regulation section 1.163-10T, in order to ensure the validity of the
regulation.160
E. The Treasury Regulation Applying the Per-Residence Approach
Would Control over the Ninth Circuit’s Opinion
The Brand X opinion established that an agency is entitled to
choose a different interpretation than a court’s prior interpretation
since the agency remains the authoritative interpreter of statutory
language.161 The agency retains the ability to construe the statute in
any way it determines meets congressional intent, even if a court’s
prior interpretation would foreclose the new interpretation.162 Here,
154. Matthew H. Friedman, Reviving National Muffler: Analyzing the Effect of Mayo
Foundation on Judicial Deference as Applied to General Authority Tax Guidance, 107 NW. U. L.
REV. 115, 122 (2012).
155. Ellen P. Aprill, The Impact of Agency Procedures and Judicial Review on Tax Reform,
65 NAT’L TAX J. 917, 918 (2012).
156. Friedman, supra note 154, at 122.
157. See Korb, supra note 129, at 358; see Friedman, supra note 154, at 122 (explaining that
the IRS treated revenue rulings and revenue procedures as binding to taxpayers with the same set
of facts).
158. Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1058 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that Treas. Reg. §
1.163-10T is also silent on the issue of whether to follow the per-taxpayer approach or perresidence approach).
159. Aprill, supra note 155, at 925.
160. See id.
161. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005).
162. Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV.
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congressional intent indicates that Code Section (h)(3) should be
interpreted under a per-residence approach.
A court’s prior interpretation of a statute can override an
agency’s interpretation only if the relevant court decision finds the
statute to be unambiguous.163 In United States v. Home Concrete &
Supply,164 the court found that the Brand X opinion requires
Chevron-style deference when “a particular statute in effect delegates
to an agency the power to fill a gap, thereby implicitly taking from a
court the power to void a reasonable gap-filling interpretation.”165
The Ninth Circuit in Voss found the statute to be silent,166 and silence
is the loudest indication that an agency is entitled to issue its own
interpretation. In essence, Home Concrete established that the
government may use regulations to reverse lower court decisions that
do not satisfy Chevron’s first step analysis.167
In light of the IRS’ position in the Sophy and Voss cases, its
prior guidance on the issue, and congressional intent, the IRS should
issue its own regulation adopting the Tax Court’s per-residence
approach. The court’s reasoning in Brand X indicates that such
regulation would supersede the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.
F. Why the Per-Residence Approach Merits Treasury
Regulation Treatment
The Code grants the Treasury authority to promulgate
regulations.168 The Code explicitly grants the Treasury interpretive
authority through several specific statutory authorizations.169 In
addition, Code section 7805(a) grants general rulemaking authority
to develop “all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of”
the Code.170 Every year, the Treasury uses both specific and general
rulemaking authority to adopt, modify, and remove Treasury

139, 144 (2012).
163. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 984.
164. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
165. Id. at 1843.
166. Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015)
167. Amanda M. Traphagan, Agency Deference After Home Concrete, 14 TEX. TECH. ADMIN.
L.J. 153, 169 (2012).
168. Hickman, supra note 146, at 1735.
169. Id. (An example of a specific statutory authorization can be found in Code section 1502,
which grants authority to promulgate regulations that are deemed necessary to clearly reflect the
income tax liability of affiliated corporations filing a single tax return).
170. Id. at 173536.
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regulations interpreting the Code.171
Because the IRS has limited resources to litigate tax cases, it
may choose not to challenge a particular case. When a case’s holding
adversely affects the Government’s legal position, the IRS may issue
an Action on Decision (“AOD”) to announce whether it will follow
the adverse decision.172 There are three possible positions that the
IRS may take in an announcement: acquiescence, acquiescence in
result only, or nonacquiesence.173 Acquiescence indicates that the
IRS accepts the court’s holding and will follow the holding when
deciding cases with the same controlling facts.174 An announcement
of acquiescence does not indicate approval or disapproval of the
court’s reasoning.175 Acquiescence in result only indicates the
acceptance of the court’s holding, but demonstrates disagreement or
concern with the court’s reasoning.176 Nonacquiesence indicates that
the IRS does not agree with the court’s holding, and will only follow
the decision in cases arising within the deciding circuit court’s
jurisdiction.177 In general, the IRS tends to adhere to a given circuit
court’s controlling precedent.178
The IRS and the Treasury expend substantial time and resources
in adopting regulations.179 For this reason, the IRS must decide
whether to allocate resources to challenge a decision, or issue an
announcement of nonacquiesence. If the IRS chooses the latter, the
Ninth Circuit’s holding would bind only Tax Court cases that are
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The issue presented in Voss merits
treasury regulation treatment for various reasons.
First, Treasury regulations aim to interpret and administer the
Code. The relevant Treasury regulation to Code section (h)(3) is
silent on the tax treatment of unmarried co-owners, despite it being a
common form of homeownership.180 In 2010, there were about 7.7

171. Id. at 1729, 1736.
172. Korb, supra note 129, at 363.
173. Id. at 366.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717,
175253 (2014).
180. Voss v. Comm’r, 796 F.3d 1051, 1058 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2015); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
C2010BR-14, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010 1, 3 (2012).

748

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:729

million unmarried couple households in the United States.181
Between 2000 and 2010, the rate of unmarried partner households
grew 41 percent, four times as fast as the overall household
population.182 In addition, the Voss decision also affects residences
owned by siblings or multiple family members. The current Treasury
regulation provides the method for determining the amount of
qualified residence interest with regard to single taxpayers and
married taxpayers filing separate returns.183 The regulation fails to
address the issue addressed by the Voss decision.184 In order to
successfully interpret and administer the Code, the regulation must
be updated to clarify the method for determining qualified residence
interest for unmarried co-owners.
Second, the mortgage interest deduction is one of the federal
government’s costliest tax expenditures. As addressed in Part I, the
mortgage interest deductions cost the Federal government $70 billion
a year.185 Third, over several decades, experts have shown that the
mortgage interest deduction is ineffective in furthering its policy goal
of incentivizing homeownership. The deduction’s little to no effect
on rate of homeownership does not justify its costs.
In addition, policy implications indicate that a per-taxpayer
approach would encourage excessive borrowing. If the mortgage
interest deduction’s debt limitations are interpreted to apply pertaxpayer, then taxpayers will be more encouraged to purchase and
co-own more expensive homes with larger mortgages.
Lastly, nonacquiesence would create an unfair advantage for
homeowners within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction. As explained in
Part V, the Voss decision allows the deduction to be skewed in favor
of co-owners with large mortgages. When the IRS issues an
announcement of acquiescence, the IRS indicates to taxpayers that
the issue will no longer be litigated.186 Co-owners within the Ninth
Circuit’s jurisdiction would be entitled to deduct interest on $2.2
million of debt or more, while their counterparts in other
jurisdictions would be limited to interest on $1.1 million of debt.
Over several decades, experts have agreed that the mortgage

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Voss, 796 F.3d at 1054.
Voss, 796 F.3d at 1058 n. 5.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 4; see Schizer, supra note 4, at 284.
Korb, supra note 129, at 36465.
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interest deduction should be phased out, and re-introduced as a credit
to encourage homeownership among taxpayers who cannot itemize
their deductions.187 Not only was the Tax Court’s per-residence
approach correct, its impact on the federal government and
U.S.taxpayers merits Treasury Regulation treatment. The deduction
is ripe for reform due to the reasons outlined above.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit erred in interpreting Code section (h)(3) as
applying the debt limitations per-taxpayer. The court incorrectly
relied on the statute’s treatment of married individuals filing separate
tax returns, therefore placing too much emphasis on the parenthetical
language’s purpose. In addition, the court failed to place any
importance on legislative history and IRS guidance on the issue. In
so doing, the court’s interpretation deviated from the proper perresidence approach.
The Ninth Circuit court should have adopted the Tax Court’s
interpretation of Code Section (h)(3). This interpretation is correct
and merits regulation treatment because it avoids a tax avoidance
shelter’s negative implications, scaling back the difference between
those who benefit from the deduction and those who cannot. For
these reasons, the IRS should finalize and issue a regulation adopting
the Tax Court’s approach in interpreting Code Section (h)(3)’s debt
limitations.

187. Morrow, supra note 1, at 800.
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